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VOIDS OR FRAGMENTATION: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES*
Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees
Institutional rules create difficulties for the allocation of moral responsibility. One problem is the
existence of responsibility voids, i.e. situations in which an outcome results from individual
interactions but for which no one is responsible. Another is that responsibility can be fragmented in
the sense that responsibility-bearing individuals may be responsible for different features of the
outcome. This study examines both problems together. We show that for a large class of situations
the two problems are logically dependent. More precisely, non-dictatorial decision procedures can
only ensure the absence of voids if they allow for the fragmentation of responsibility.
1. The Question
Responsibility attributions are a very elementary means by which we regulate our social,
political and economic affairs. The root idea of holding a person responsible is to
declare that the person is a legitimate target for adverse or beneficial treatment,
signalling that he should modify or maintain his conduct. As a matter of justice, it is
quite obvious that we need to get our ‘responsibility system’ right. Simply put: a
distorted allocation of responsibility will not only be considered unfair but can easily be
seen as sending the wrong signal about the appropriateness of behaviour.
Getting a responsibility allocation right is, however, anything but straightforward.
Broadly speaking, there are two main problems to be solved. The first is the choice of a
first-order normative system, which is the set of principles that yield the general
conditions for assigning moral responsibility. These conditions define the grounds of
responsibility: who is to be held to account and for what. Determination of these
conditions has been the focus of most of the philosophical analysis of moral and legal
responsibility. The second problem has received less attention. It concerns the way in
which institutional structures affect responsibility assignments. Here the question to be
answered is, given an account of the grounds of responsibility, how does the context of
interaction – the second-order normative system – determine the resulting responsi-
bility assignment.
It is important to clearly demarcate these two parts of a responsibility assignment.
The grounds of responsibility refer to general conditions that are defined indepen-
dently from particular circumstances. The grounds should be stable across both time
and a wide variety of conditions. Yet the verdicts that the grounds return will vary with
the structure of interaction. For instance, a committee may deliver different outcomes
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depending on the decision rule in use, even if the opinions or votes of the individual
committee members remain stable. This is because different decision rules aggregate
the individual inputs in different ways and thus the resulting responsibility assignments
may also differ. The precise question we address in this article is this: given a first-order
normative system of the canonical ‘folk ethics’ principles of moral responsibility, do
second-order systems exist that allocate moral responsibility in an ideal way?
This question needs to be acuminated further. When your conduct becomes
interwoven with others, two fundamental problems will arise from the fact that the
consequences will now depend not only on what you have done and the information
and options you have, but also on actions and information of others. The first problem
refers to what we have previously coined as responsibility voids (Braham and van Hees,
2011). The other is what we denote here as the fragmentation of responsibility. A
responsibility void is a situation in which a combination of actions by different
individuals leads to an outcome for which none of the individuals involved can be said
to be responsible. Fragmented responsibility occurs when a combination of actions by
different individuals leads to an outcome for which at least some of the responsible
individuals are responsible for different features of the outcome. In a rough sense,
both these issues can be considered as different facets of Dennis Thompson’s ‘problem
of many hands’: ‘[b]ecause many different officials contribute in many ways to
decisions and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify who is
morally responsible for political outcomes’ (Thompson, 1980, p. 905).1
To deliver a first answer to our question, we examine in this article the existence of
forms of strategic interaction that are immune to both responsibility voids and
fragmented responsibility. We demonstrate that under a set of very general conditions
voids and fragmentation are logically dependent. More concretely, we show that
institutional safeguards against responsibility voids have important implications for the
fragmentation of responsibility (how responsibility is differentially allocated). The
result is, therefore, to be understood in terms of mechanism design. We investigate the
possibility of constructing modes of strategic interaction that generate assignments of
responsibility that respect certain properties.
There are three methodological features of our analysis to be flagged at the outset.
Firstly, by a decision-making mechanism we mean the institutional rules that combine
individual actions into a collective decision. We describe these rules in an abstract
game-theoretical framework. An institutional setting is described by a game form. We
also focus on classes of game forms rather than any particular one, permitting us to
hone in on the structural aspects of such a mechanism in which responsibility voids or
fragmentation occur. Furthermore, we understand these institutional mechanisms in a
very general way: they can be centralised or decentralised aggregations of choices; they
can be a single committee vote or a chain of individual decisions or committee
decisions. Our model places no restrictions on how a multiplicity of individuals interact
with each other.
Secondly, our analysis is individualistic in two senses. The first concerns the bearers
of moral responsibility, which we take to be concrete individuals, and not collections of
1 See also Bovens (1998) for a detailed institutional study of the problem.
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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individuals even though we are dealing with multi-agent interactions (the responsibility
of such collections will not be the focus of our attention here).2 This is individualistic
only in a weak sense because we only assume that the concept of individual moral
responsibility does not derive from the concept of collective moral responsibility.3 The
second sense of individualistic is that when we determine the allocation of individual
responsibility, no independent weight will be given to considerations outside the
conduct of individuals. That is, a responsibility allocation is to be based solely on the
way the mechanisms of social interaction combine individual conduct into outcomes.
Thirdly, our study is an idealised one. The object of our analysis is the structure of a
decision-making mechanism and we abstract away from many of the things that
characterise actual human beings and institutions, such as their mutual attractions,
repulsions, and influence as well as formal roles, offices, and institutionalised patterns
of behaviour. We assume, however, that the agents are autonomous in a minimal sense
and that they possess the relevant knowledge about the decision situation at hand.
Additionally, we restrict ourselves to what is best termed as ‘normal’ decision-making.
This means we will bracket out the consequences of ‘unreasonable’ (or ‘ineligible’)
actions, the standard of which we leave as a primitive.4
We start our analysis in Section 2 by laying out the principles of what we call the ‘folk
ethics’ conception of moral responsibility for outcomes. In Section 3, we define and
discuss what we mean by responsibility voids and fragmentation and set out three
fundamental properties for responsibility allocations for decision-making mechanisms.
Our main result and a discussion of its implications follows in Section 4. In Sections 5–
7, we interrogate the framework and the result. Section 8 is a conclusion.
Before taking up our analysis, we would like to remark that the chief contribution of
this article is based on a formal result. In order to communicate the result to the widest
possible audience, we have relegated the entire formal framework and the proofs to the
Appendix. No special technical knowledge is presupposed in the main body of the text.
2. The Grounds of Moral Responsibility
The concept of responsibility is used in many different ways. The way in which we use it
here, and which we believe to be the relevant one for studying institutionalised
interactions, is in terms of individual accountability. This conception singles out how
our conduct as concrete individuals is related to a given outcome.5 Deeper factors such
as our identity, attitudes, values, and community relations play no explicit role in this
notion. Accountability refers to what we have done as a concrete individual and not for
what we are or what we represent. Furthermore, we take the scope of accountability to
be limited to the consequences (the outcomes) of our actions.
There are various conceptions of this notion of responsibility. The one that we rely
on here is based on a regimentation of the so-called ‘folk ethics’ version of
2 See List and Pettit (2011) for a recent contribution on the responsibility of collections of individuals.
3 See for instance the classic expositions in Lewis (1948) and Hart (2008). See also the discussions in
Sverdlik (1987) and Mellema (1997).
4 These actions may include maiming oneself or ending one’s life. For a classic discussion on unreasonable
actions, see Benn and Weinstein (1971).
5 See the discussion in Watson (2004, pp. 260ff). See also Cane (2002).
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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responsibility that we have developed elsewhere.6 The nub of this conception says that
a person can be ascribed responsibility for a given outcome, or some aspect of it, if
three conditions are satisfied. The first concerns agency: to be an apt object of a
responsibility attribution an individual must be minimally autonomous. There are
different views about the nature of the required autonomy, but usually it means that
the individual is able to act intentionally, to plan, and to distinguish right and wrong
and good and bad. The second condition concerns causal relevance. This says that
there should be a causal relation between the conduct of the agent and the resultant
outcome. The third condition is what we call the avoidance condition: it concerns a
person’s opportunity to do otherwise. This refers to the assumption that a person
should have had the possibility to avoid causally contributing to the outcome and that
at least some of those alternative courses of action can be said to be reasonable ones.7
If any of these conditions are not satisfied it means that we are not responsible for
the consequences of our actions. You are not responsible for the mess you made when
you were sleepwalking (lack of agency). You are not responsible for the death of
President Kennedy if you were not involved in any way in his assassination (no causal
contribution). And as a bank teller you are not responsible for the bank robbery if you
could not have stopped it (no alternative) or only by seriously risking your life (no
reasonable alternative).
These conditions need to be fleshed out because there are many ways in which we
can say that a person has agency, has made a causal contribution, or has had a
reasonable opportunity to avoid a causal contribution. Setting aside agency completely
(we assume that our agents satisfy the relevant conditions), our criterion for a causal
contribution is a weak form of counterfactual dependence known as the NESS test.8
This test denotes c as a causal condition for e if there is an event that is sufficient for e
such that:
(i) c is a member of the set;
(ii) all elements of the event obtain; and
(iii) c is necessary for the sufficiency of the event.
In short, c is a causal condition for e if c is a necessary element of a sufficient set of
conditions for e ; or: c is a cause of e if e depends on c under some circumstances that
were present on the occasion.
The avoidance condition has a number of features that require elaboration.9 Firstly,
this is a refinement of the ‘ought implies can’ principle. If we are responsible for an
outcome given that we have performed some action with a causal connection to that
6 See Braham and van Hees (2012). This conception is also known as the ‘tripartite conception’, see
Feinberg (1970, p. 196).
7 The condition is motivated by the views developed by McKenna (1997), Wyma (1997), Otsuka (1998)
and Hetherington (2003). A very recent expression is Sartorio (2012). These views are, however, not
undisputed. For a critique, see Fischer (1999).
8 Hart and Honore (1959) and Wright (1988). The NESS test is closely related to Mackie’s (1974) notion
of an INUS condition. For an extensive discussion of the use of the INUS/NESS test for very similar contexts
as the ones we discuss here, see Tuck (2008). The reason for choosing the NESS test, instead of, say, Lewis’s
(1973) account of counterfactual dependence, is that this conception resolves basic quandaries of causal
overdetermination. For a discussion, see Braham and van Hees (2009).
9 We provide an extensive discussion of this criterion in Braham and van Hees (2012).
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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outcome, then an alternative action must have been available. Secondly, the condition
targets alternative courses of action, not alternative outcomes. It is about doing your
best to prevent an outcome by choosing a strategy that reduces the probability that
your action is a NESS condition for an outcome; it is not about you having full control
over that outcome. Thirdly, we only focus on the part of the condition that stipulates
that there should be some alternative. We set aside the requirement that the alternative
should be reasonable by simply assuming that all alternatives available to an agent are
reasonable.10
Having set out the requirements for saying that someone bears moral responsibility,
we have to explicate the objects for which she is or is not responsible. This is the scope
of responsibility. Our target here is outcomes. But what does this mean? At first blush,
it is a situation that has resulted from some prior events such as voting, shooting or
travelling. So, for example, we may say that outcomes are ‘Ben was offered the job in
the economics department’, ‘Jones was killed’, or ‘you are in Paris’. Yet, each of these
statements is still imprecise because they only isolate certain features of an outcome.
An outcome actually has many other features: Ben was offered the job but Alice and
Charlie were not; Jones was killed but Smith got his kidney and his life was thus saved;
you are in a cheerful mood whilst climbing the stairs of the Eiffel Tower.
We take an outcome to be a possible world (or a social state in the terminology of
economics), with its features being described by the sets of possible worlds to which it
belongs. We call these sets states of affairs. Thus, you being in Paris is a state of affairs
described by a set of worlds in which you are in Paris. A possible world can belong to
different sets of possible worlds, and it is for this reason that an outcome can be seen as
a combination of features. Hence, a particular outcome may not only belong to the set
of outcomes of being in Paris, but also to the one in which you are in a cheerful mood,
climb the Eiffel Tower etc. Note that not all of the features of an outcome will be
morally relevant. For example, the fact that Ben wears glasses or is bald might not be a
morally relevant feature of the outcome of hiring him; the fact that he is a man and
that his appointment maintains an historical gender imbalance might be. For our
purposes, we simply assume that any set of possible worlds to which an outcome
belongs can be relevant (we elaborate on this in Section 5).
3. Three Properties
The focus of our study is the allocation of responsibility for outcomes that are brought
about by multi-agent interactions. We call these ‘collective outcomes’ for short (there is
no requirement that the collection of agents form a ‘collectivity’ in any sense of joint,
common or organic agency). This focus means that we want to examine decision-
making mechanisms in which no single agent has all the decision-making power. We
call this a non-dictatorship property.
Denote a dictator as an agent who can force any possible outcome in the decision
problem, whether it be a decision on who is appointed to a job, that your company will
10 The restriction is mainly for reasons of simplification as our framework can be extended by introducing
the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable alternatives. Such an extension would, however, leave
our main result untouched. It would only complicate the presentation and proof of it.
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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join a cartel, or that the colour of your kitchen walls will be pink. If you are a dictator
you can adopt a course of action that will lead to your chosen outcome irrespective of
what others do.
PROPERTY 1 (NON-DICTATORSHIP).There is no dictator.
Our second property concerns responsibility voids, which are outcomes in which
none of the individuals are responsible for a given state of affairs. Pettit (2007)
suggested this possibility in his discussion of the so-called ‘discursive dilemma’. This is
the situation in which a committee has to make a judgement about a set of
interconnected questions. A yes–no vote is taken on each of the questions. The
combination of the majority judgements subsequently yields a decision for which the
committee members are unanimously opposed even though there is a majority in
favour for each of the questions. If the final decision is made on these majorities then
we can have a situation in which despite unanimous opposition to the final verdict in
favour it will still go through. And since this opposition is unanimous, Pettit claims that
none of the individuals can be held responsible. There is apparently a void. (We return
to this case in Section 6.)
For an example of voids outside the setting of committees, consider a classic
model of a pure coordination game. Two friends have an appointment to meet
each other but they forgot to discuss the meeting place. There are two equally likely
venues, Grand Central Station and Cafe Central, and they must choose to go to one
or the other without knowing what the other will choose. As it happened, they
made different choices and failed to meet. Now, while they both clearly are
responsible for the particular outcome of having gone to Grand Central Station or
Cafe Central, neither of them is morally responsible for the fact that they did not
meet each other: they did not have a strategy with a smaller probability of leading
to that state of affairs.
Ideally, a responsibility system should not have voids for the very reason that the
purpose of such a system is to aid our self-governance. It is like a ‘loophole in our
morality’.11 We formulate a property to this effect. We say that a mechanism is
complete if it can never lead to a responsibility void. This means that for any state
of affairs there is at least one person who is morally responsible for its occurrence.
PROPERTY 2 (COMPLETENESS).The decision-making mechanism has no voids.
Our third property is novel. It airs and gives explicit formal substance to an implicit
thought that can be found in discussions about the allocation of moral responsibility
for collective outcomes. The property concerns what we have already denoted as the
fragmentation of responsibility. Fragmentation and its converse, what we call
uniformity, is a subtle and complex property that can be interpreted in various ways.
For that reason, we will first state the property and then examine it more fully in the
Sections that follow as part of the discussion of our main result.
11 For a discussion of loopholes in morality, see Pogge (1992).
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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What, precisely, is a fragmented allocation of responsibility? In our account,
responsibility should only be attributed to you for those aspects of a given outcome in
which youwere involved.These are features of the outcome for which your conductmade
a causal contribution. Your causal involvement in the realisation of some particular
featureof theoutcomeneednot, however, put you in thedock or on thepedestal for all of
its features. To see this, consider the hiring committee of an economics department that
appointed Ben rather than one of two other candidates, Alice or Charlie. Assume that
Ben and Alice are social choice theorists, whereas Charlie is an econometrician. Suppose
the committee used a plurality rule with a tie-breaker and as it turned out there was a tie
among all three candidates and that the chairman’s vote, whichwas for Ben, broke the tie.
According to our account, the committee member who voted for Alice is responsible for
the hiring of a social choice theorist. This is easily checked. The vote for Alice contributed
to the tie and thus also to the election of Ben, who is a social choice theorist. Hence, the
requirement of causal contribution in Ben’s appointment is met. Furthermore, the
person could have voted for Charlie, a vote that had a lower probability of leading to the
appointment of a social choice theorist. Clearly, this committee member is not
responsible for the fact that a male candidate is hired since the vote for Alice minimised
that probability. On the other hand, the committee member who voted for Charlie is
responsible for aman being appointed, althoughnot for the appointment being in social
choice theory, given that Charlie is an econometrician.
Now, despite all being part of a common and institutionalised procedure and
contributing to a common outcome – Ben being hired – we see that the committee
members are in fact responsible for different features of the outcome. Only the
chairperson is responsible for all the features. At first glance, this seems reasonable as it
is an exact match with the intuition behind the folk ethics conception: each one of us is
responsible for the consequences that flow from our own conduct and not the
consequences that flow from the conduct of others (insofar as we do not have special
vicarious relationships to others). Thus, this allocation of responsibility can be
defended on the grounds of the submitted votes (voting for different candidates yields
different responsibility) or the different roles of the committee members. For instance,
with respect to the chairman’s responsibility, it seems plausible that the extent of
responsibility should track additional decision-making power. One is reminded of
Spiderman’s rendition of an insight supposedly first formulated by Voltaire: ‘With
great power comes great responsibility’.
Yet, there are cases and contexts in which we may want to avoid such an allocation
(especially when it is clear to the agents involved that the outcome is the result of the
interaction of individual decisions). That is, we want to structure the institutional
environment and modes of interaction so as to guarantee responsibility will not be
fragmented. We discuss these reasons later but it is useful to note that there are at least
three normative reasons. Firstly, uniformity makes the responsibility allocation more
transparent. Secondly, uniformity may capture an ideal of procedural fairness. And
thirdly, the fragmentation of responsibility is associated with another and ‘deeper’ and
undesirable form of the fragmentation of our value system.
So, given our account of responsibility does there exist a decision-making
mechanism such that the following property is satisfied?
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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PROPERTY 3 (UNIFORMITY). A decision-making mechanism never displays any fragmenta-
tion of responsibility: all individuals that are responsible for some feature of the outcome are
responsible for the very same features.
As a point of clarification, while we will refer to the properties as conditions, we are
using them here primarily in a descriptive sense. That is, we do not claim that every
mechanism should possess these three features. Rather we consider it useful to know
which decision-making mechanisms possess them as it will impart at a very general level
information about the allocation of responsibility that we can expect.
4. The Theorem
The three conditions and our account of moral responsibility can be formulated in a
game theoretic framework. This permits us to capture multi-agent interactions in a very
general way (see the Appendix). In this framework, we call the decision-making
mechanisms we are examining responsibility games. The following theorem holds:
THEOREM 1. If a responsibility game is uniform and complete, then it is dictatorial.12
The Theorem says that there is a logical interdependence between our three
conditions. We arrive, so to speak, at possibilities and impossibilities. It is possible to
have uniform and complete decision-making mechanisms, but this comes at the cost of
concentrating the decisions in the hand of a single agent – a dictator – who has
complete and full responsibility. Alternatively, if we have, or are required to have, a
non-degenerate multi-agent decision-making mechanism, then it is impossible to
satisfy completeness and uniformity simultaneously. In other words, some fragmenta-
tion or some voids are built into the warp and woof of multi-agent decision-making.
There appears to be no perfect responsibility system for the folk ethics account of
responsibility.
5. Technicalities
Is there a way out? Can we drop any of the conditions? Before examining each in
turn, we need to dispel possible technical objections to the analytical framework as
such. One possibility we have already referred to is that the source of the trouble
lies with our methodological individualism. Instead, what is required for determin-
ing responsibility in multi-agent interactions is another method altogether. Rather
than beginning with the individual and his actions, we should begin with groups or
collectives and examine the causal contribution that such ‘collective agents’ make to
the outcome.
On this view, responsibility voids may disappear when we allow for the assignment of
responsibility to collective agents. In other words, although it may be the case that
none of the individuals are responsible for some feature of the outcome, some group
12 The theorem is a generalisation of Proposition 3 in van Hees (2010).
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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of individuals that possess the characteristics of collective agency might said to be so.
For instance, in a coordination game, it is obviously true that the coalition of all players
can realise any outcome. As explained above, we do not pursue this route here since
our project is to interrogate an individualistic approach to responsibility.13 One
interpretation of the theorem could be that it highlights the boundaries of
methodological individualism for the assignment of responsibility.
A second objection concerns the assumption that any (non-empty and proper)
subset of the set of outcomes is a relevant state of affairs. This is a rather demanding
assumption indeed. The number of states of affairs rapidly becomes very large if the
number of outcomes increases, and we will not be interested in many of them. We have
already mentioned that some of the features of an outcome are irrelevant (e.g. the
baldness of a candidate or the fact that the number of items in his tax return is a
prime). If some of the states of affairs with respect to which voids arise only concern
such irrelevant features, then there is no reason for concern. We do believe this is a
legitimate concern. Yet it should be pointed out that the force of the argument is
weakened by the fact that the proof of our result does not require the entire set of
features. It is, therefore, unlikely that the voids only arise in unproblematic cases.
Establishing exactly which features yield the impossibility result is a natural next step,
but is beyond the scope of this article.
Finally, one could object to the way the scope of the result is defined. We have
shown that for any game form and any probability distribution, there is some play
that yields either a void or fragmentation of responsibility. Yet we do not make any
assumptions about the relation between the probabilities and the play in question.
This entails that the impossibility may be hypothetical only. The general result
merely states that there is some play of this responsibility game in which there is a
void or fragmentation. To illustrate with an abstract example, consider the following
three-player, non-dictatorial game form with three outcomes x, y and z. According
to the rules of the game, a single choice for x is sufficient for x to be the outcome;
but if no player chooses x, then a single choice for y is sufficient for y to be the
outcome; z will be the outcome only if all individuals choose z. Now, consider the
scenario in which all players attach a probability of 1 to all of the others choosing z
and everyone does indeed choose z. This play of the game does not exhibit voids or
fragmentation. To see this, note that all players are responsible for {z} and {y, z}
because a choice for x had a larger avoidance potential for those sets than choosing
z, and all are responsible for {x, z} because voting for y had a larger avoidance
potential for it than a choice for z. Hence, uniformity and completeness are both
satisfied. In contrast, uniformity is violated in the very same game form if, despite
the beliefs that each player has that the others will choose z, one player did not
vote for z but for x and one player voted for y. This generates fragmented
responsibility: in this play, the player who chose x is responsible for all features of
the outcome (i.e. for {x}, {x, y} and {x, z}), whereas the single y-voter is responsible
for {x,y} but not for {x} or {x,z}.
13 For a defence of the view that the coordination failure is to be solved at the level of the group, see
Bacharach (2006). For a more general discussion of group agency and responsibility see Pettit (2007) and
List and Pettit (2011).
© 2018 Royal Economic Society.
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6. Dictators or Voids?
Permitting dictatorial rules will of course give us an unambiguous allocation of
responsibility. But this option can be dismissed with relative ease. First and foremost
there is an obvious practical issue: it is impossible to implement it broadly in our social
life, much of which consists of decentralised multi-agent decisions of the kind that our
coordination game mentioned above exemplifies. Second, for those circumstances for
which we can design our interactions, a single authoritative decision-maker is also
unattractive. One cluster of normative problems concerns the adverse consequences of
concentrations of power. We lose, for instance, the epistemic and representative
advantages that ‘democratic’ participation brings (which implies voter choices can be
effective). A second cluster of problems refers to the intrinsic disvalue of such a
concentration of power. One significant source of disvalue is that having a single
decision-maker runs counter to another form of responsibility that is important in our
social life and self-governance, that of ‘taking responsibility’.14
Can we drop completeness? Such a strategy certainly has morally disturbing
implications. It is tantamount to saying that it is permissible to have institutions that
can create outcomes in which no one will be responsible. One need only think of
major corporate harms such as the Union Carbide India gas leak in Bhopal, the sinking
of the Townsend Thoresen ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, or now the Volkswagen
emissions scandal, to see that a responsibility void would let culpable managers off the
hook.
One tack to drop completeness is to play down the significance of voids in terms of
the likelihood of their occurrence. This is similar to the way in which social choice
theorists play down the likelihood of voting paradoxes. We could then conclude that
voids are a very special kind of phenomena. This is something that we have in fact
previously suggested (Braham and van Hees, 2011). We demonstrated that in the
specific setting of institutionalised committee decision-making voids are in fact
unlikely. First, one significant kind of void discussed in the literature has already been
excluded by our analysis. This is the void that can occur in the so-called discursive
dilemma that Pettit refers to and that we mentioned above. In our account, for an
individual to be held as morally responsible he must have had a reasonable
opportunity to have minimised his causal contribution to the outcome. Now, a void
emerges in Pettit’s analysis, and not in ours, because he presupposes that acting
strategically is not a reasonable (or eligible) alternative for the committee members. In
our analysis, the void would not have arisen if the members had voted ‘non-truthfully’
or better put, ‘strategically’ (not in accordance with what they really believed to be
true). In our view, voting in this way is indeed a reasonable alternative. Hence, we call
this a normative void because it occurs due to a purported moral impermissibility of
voting in this way. Adhering to this moral rule is what generates the void. If, on the
other hand, strategic behaviour of this kind in the discursive dilemma is morally
permissible, and one can argue that it is, such a void will not arise.
14 This argument could be developed along Kantian lines. Alternatively, it could emphasise the
importance of character traits that are necessary for human development and flourishing. In the latter case,
the touchstone text is Mill’s well-known discussion of the problems of dictators in his ‘Considerations on
Representative Government’ (2008/1859). See also Dewey (1960).
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We also have discussed a second class of voids, which we have labelled as epistemic
voids. These, as the label suggests, occur due to the factual beliefs of the individuals
involved. In particular, they arise in a circumstance in which each individual has a false
but justified belief about the situation at hand. The belief leads them incorrectly to
assign zero probability to alternative contingencies. Since their beliefs are justified,
however, the relevant avoidance potential is zero and we do not hold the agents
responsible. We argued, however, that the exact conditions yielding such epistemic
voids are rather peculiar and thus we need not worry about them either.
The problem here is that these arguments about normative and epistemic voids are
not very convincing outside the institutional setting of committee decision-making
(and it was exactly that kind of decision-making that we were addressing). One
example of a void was given by the coordination game in the previous Section. The
example might suggest that such voids should be equated with blameless harms. It is
unfortunate that the two friends were unable to meet each other but coordination
failures are a fact of social life and that here, too, we need not be overly concerned
about them. But it is not straightforward that most coordination games do belong to
this moral category.15 Bowles (2004, pp. 23–24), for instance, recounts a real-life share-
cropping example from India, which matches the well-known Stag Hunt game, and
argues that it is one of the sources of poverty. A discussion about the frequency with
which morally non-trivial coordination problems occur is beyond the scope of this
article. But even if they are uncommon, there are instrumental reasons for wanting to
ensure that they cannot arise: if the outcome is a serious harm, a complete (no voids)
decision-making mechanism guarantees that the decision-makers will have reasons to
act in such a way as to prevent the harm occurring again.
We conclude that we do not want to give up the non-dictatorship condition. Most
institutional structures already prevent the emergence of voids and, insofar as they do
not, we have reason to ensure that they do. Hence, our result entails that we have to
accept the possibility of non-uniform or fragmented allocations of responsibility.
7. The Problem of Fragmentation
Should we be worried about the possibility of fragmentation? We already suggested
that there are various social settings in which we are not only prepared to accept
fragmentation but in which it is in fact a desirable property. These are the cases in
which collective outcomes are the result of decentralised or even random interactions.
Here, indeed, we may want our responsibility allocation to reflect the differences
among the contributions of the members. Yet, the fact that we are willing to accept
fragmentation in some or even many institutional settings does not yield the
conclusion that we should always be willing to do so. One needs only to think of
formal institutional settings (company, school, department) in which different
individuals have the same roles and tasks that are all tied together by an internal
decision-structure. Here it is uniformity and not fragmentation that is the desideratum.
15 See Braham and van Hees (2014) for a recent example of the normative problems that such games
generate.
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The problem of fragmented responsibility is that it lacks transparency – it is opaque –
for those seeking to hold individuals responsible for some collective outcome. That is,
if any two individuals are said to be morally responsible for some outcome and owe
compensation or are due punishment, then uniformity means that they will do so in
exactly the same measure. Uniform allocations of responsibility circumvents the need
for contestable judgements about how much more responsibility one individual bears
in comparison to another for an outcome that they jointly authored. This must be
understood as more than just a pragmatic consideration. Consider once more the case
of the hiring committee: is it really true that the committee member who voted for
Charlie is less responsible for the outcome in which Ben is appointed than the
chairperson? To determine this would mean that we have to weigh up the moral
importance of different features and each allocation could easily be contested by those
wanting to shirk any blame. If a system is uniform, then no such problem would occur.
Note that the condition of uniformity is not an attribution rule: it does not pin one
person’s wrongdoing on another. Rather, to say that a decision-making mechanism is
uniform simply describes how it allocates responsibility, given the inputs. Another way
of expressing the importance of the property is to say that despite the individual
features of your conduct, if two individuals did something of equal moral significance,
then each are equally responsible. That is to say, morality sometimes requires that a
responsibility allocation should be neutral with respect to the individual features of
conduct.
A second reason for desiring a uniform allocation of responsibility relates to equality
of influence. This is an ideal that has wide scope, from decision-making in small
organisations (firms, a university) to large ones (a national polity). We can express this
ideal in terms of a norm of procedural justice. Why should individuals who are tied
together via a decision-making mechanism and have an ex ante equal opportunity to
influence the outcome of a collective undertaking be held differentially responsible?
One view to take is that ex ante equality of influence should translate into ex post
equality of responsibility.
How exactly this aspect of ‘decisional’ or political equality should be implemented is
open for debate. We can go from a simple ‘one person, one vote’ to a more elaborate
account of the way in which individual choices contribute to collective outcomes.
Alternatively, we can take an ex post or retrospective view and focus on the actual impact
that people have had on an outcome. Here responsibility enters the equation because
it tracks this impact. To say that you are responsible for a feature of the outcome is to
say that you were influential in bringing it about. Uniformity aligns this impact with the
assignment of responsibility and guarantees the equality of this impact. Stated
differently, uniformity is an ideal of equality. It does not express that our institutions
guarantee that we have equal opportunity for influence, but that any influence is always
exercised equally. Of course, this is a radical ideal. In fact, our result shows that it may
indeed be too radical because in the absence of voids, such equality cannot be
guaranteed.
Finally, we need to take into account that fragmentation may be symptomatic of a
problem at the heart of the ethics of voting. The issue at hand is that the fragmentation
of responsibility can be associated with another form of fragmentation, that between
what we are responsible for and the values we hold. Consider the infamous US
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presidential elections in 2000 in which George W Bush won his first term of office.
Recall the following schematic account. Ignoring the fringe candidates and abstentions,
we can distinguish three possible outcomes: Bush wins, Gore wins, and Nader wins. Now
hone in on Florida and New Hampshire, two states won by Bush but in which Nader and
Gore together had the majority of the popular vote. For these states, we arrive at a
distribution of responsibility in which the Bush voters were responsible for all features of
the outcome (Bush winning, Gore losing, and Nader losing) and the Gore voters for
Nader losing but not for Bush winning or Gore losing.16
Now turn to the Nader voters. They were causally effective for Bush winning but
had a strategy – to vote for Gore – which would have decreased their ex ante
probability of being effective for Bush winning. They were thus responsible for Bush
carrying their state and, since the New Hampshire and Florida results both formed a
NESS-condition, for Bush winning the presidency. It is this responsibility of the
Nader voters that we see that fragmentation can be associated with a failure of moral
responsibility to track a voter’s value system. For most of the Nader voters, the
ideological distance from Bush was very large. Their responsibility for Bush becoming
president therefore shows there to be a gap between their responsibility and their
values.17 The problem is sharpened if one looks at the alternative course of action
that a Nader voter in swing states had. If a Nader wanted to avoid the responsibility
for a Bush victory, that voter would have had to vote for Gore and in so doing would
not have had the opportunity to let his or her vote fully express their political values.
Moreover, had the Nader voter voted in this way, he or she would have made
themselves morally responsible for Nader losing – precisely what should not happen
in view of the values that voter holds (and assuming of course that this voter is a
rational and coherent personality).18
This is what we take to be the third problem of fragmentation, namely, that
accountability may no longer be in line with a person’s value system. That is, the
example of the US presidential elections highlights a potential and irreconcilable
trade-off in democratic systems: that between our moral responsibility for collective
outcomes and a core component of our moral life in a democracy, the public
expression of our political values. Our theorem says that we can only guarantee that
these values run together at the expense of completeness (accepting the possibility of
responsibility voids).
16 Note that by the NESS test, all voters, including those who voted for Gore, made a causal contribution to
Bush winning. The reason is that when determining the causal contribution that a voter makes, one looks for
the subset of the actual votes in which an actual vote happens to be critical. The logic of the framework
implies that there are subsets in which Nader would be winning if a Gore-voter were to vote for Nader. This is
not as counter-intuitive as it may seem, because it is precisely the same reasoning that determines that the
Nader voters were causally effective for Bush winning (which is more obvious). Furthermore, the causal
contribution of a voter is not to be conflated with the moral responsibility of the voter. In this case, despite
the Gore voters causally contributing to Bush’s victory they were not responsible for Bush becoming
president because in our framework voting for Gore was the strategy that maximised their avoidance
potential for Bush’s victory.
17 See Wolf (1990) and Watson (2004) for a discussion of this ‘self-disclosure’ aspect of moral
responsibility. For the importance of expressive voting, see Brennan and Lomasky (1993).
18 A similar phenomenon occurred in the 2002 French presidential elections. Everyone who in the first
round did not vote for Jospin (including those who voted for candidates more on the left) were responsible
for the eventual outcome of Chirac being re-elected.
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8. Conclusion
The institutional design result posed here says that for the individualistic folk ethics
conception of moral responsibility, there is no way of structuring social interactions
that have the three properties: non-dictatorship, completeness (no responsibility
voids) and uniformity (no fragmentation). Either we plump for a dictator, which is
undesirable or infeasible, or we have to accept voids or fragmentation. This result is
foundational and inescapable.
Guaranteeing the absence of voids entails the inevitability of fragmentation of
responsibility. In many cases fragmentation will not be problematic since it merely
reflects the different roles that individuals happen to play in bringing about an
outcome. Given that we believe there to be better reasons to organise our collective
affairs around rules that do not permit voids, we must accept fragmentation. But this
entails that injustices may arise, that a radical ideal of equality will sometimes be
violated, and that an allocation will not always track individual values. At this stage, our
practical guidance for institutional designers can only be very broad. To sharpen it, we
would have to examine the exact conditions under which fragmentation can be
accepted. Also, can uniformity be modified in such a way that voids are still excluded
without paying the price of procedural fairness, inequality of influence or inadequate
value-tracking? If so, which institutions correspond with it? Our analysis has isolated
what we believe to be the real challenge posed by the problem of moral responsibility
for collective outcomes.
Appendix A. Formal Statement and Proof
A.1. Definitions and Notation
X is a finite set of outcomes (alternatives, possible worlds) with at least three elements and
N = {1, . . ., n} is a finite set of individuals. The set of all non-empty proper subsets of X is
denoted by [X] and its elements are called states of affairs.
DEFINITION 1. A game form G is an n + 1-tuple G = (S1, . . ., Sn, p) where each Si denotes the finite
set of strategies of i 2 N. A play sn = (s1, . . ., sn) is a particular element of S1 9 ⋯ 9 Sn, and p is an
outcome function, i.e. a mapping from the set of all plays to X.
For all T ⊆ N, we call an element sT of Pi2T Si an event. We write (sT, sNT) to denote the play
which consists of the combination of the (mutually exclusive) events sT and sNT. If T ⊆ U and if
all i 2 T adopt the same strategy in sT as in sU, sT is called a subevent of sU. The set p(sT) denotes
the set of outcomes that can result from the event sT: pðsT Þ ¼ fpðsT ; sNT Þ j sNT 2 Pi 62T Sig. If A
is a singleton set, say A = {x}, we omit the set brackets and write p(sT) = x just like we write X  x
(rather than X  {x}) or N  i (instead of N  {i}).
DEFINITION 2. For any play sN and i 2 N, an individual strategy s of i is said to be a cause of A (and i
causally effective) if, and only if, there is a subevent sT of sN such that:
(i) i adopts s in ST;
(ii) p(sT) ⊆ A; and
(iii) pðsTiÞ 6 A.
With each game form G and each individual, we associate a probability distribution pi over the
set of the strategy combinations of the others. For any i, A 2 [X] and s 2 Si , qiðAjsÞ denotes s’s
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avoidance potential for A. Let for each individual i and each s 2 Si , hi(s,A) = {si∣i is not effective





DEFINITION 3. Let A 2 [X]. We call a strategy s 2 Si an A-minimal strategy (A-maximal) if, and only
if, the strategy’s avoidance potential for A is at least as large as (smaller than or equal to) that of any other
strategy. A player i is called a dummy player if for all x 2 X, any s 2 Si is x-maximal and x-minimal. A
coalition T is decisive for some x 2 X if pðsxT Þ ¼ x for any x-maximising T-event sxT , where an x-maximizing
T-vent is defined as the event in which all i in T play an x-maximising strategy.
We write sA to denote that a strategy s is A-maximal and sA to denote that it is A-minimal. We do
not make any assumptions about how the various probability functions pi are to be inferred from
the game form or from other information (e.g. preferences). We do make one regularity
assumption and that is that any individual strategy s that is A-maximal for some A will be X  A-
minimal, that is, for any such s we have s = sA = sXA.
19
The combination of a game form G with an n-tuple of probability distributions p is denoted by
Gp and is called a responsibility game.
DEFINITION 4. Given a responsibility game Gp, and a play sN = (s1, . . ., sn), an individual i 2 N is
responsible for A 2 [X] if and only if:
(i) i is causally effective for A in sN; and
(ii) qiðAjs0Þ [ qiðAjsiÞ for some s0 2 Si .
Given some responsibility game Gp and play sN, an individual i is responsibility-bearing if he is
responsible for some A 2 [X].
DEFINITION 5. A responsibility game is uniform iff for any play sN it holds that all responsibility-bearing
individuals in that play are responsible for the very same set of features of the outcome: if i is responsible in
that play for some A 2 [X] and j is responsible for some B 2 [X], then j is also responsible for A, and i for B.
DEFINITION 6. A responsibility game displays a responsibility void iff there is a play sN and an A 2 [X]
such that pðsN Þ 2 A and none of the individuals is responsible for A. A responsibility game is complete if it
does not display a responsibility void.
DEFINITION 7. A responsibility game is dictatorial iff there is some i 2 N such that for all x 2 X there is
some s 2 Si with p(s) = x.
A.2. Proof of Main Result
THEOREM 1. If a responsibility game is uniform and complete, then it is dictatorial.
We start with three useful lemmata.
LEMMA 1. Let Gp be a responsibility game.
(i) For all sN and all i, if i adopts an A-minimal strategy in sN, then i is not responsible for A in sN.
19 As an anonymous referee has pointed out the exact conditions under which the assumption holds may
be difficult to establish. We do not examine this issue further, leaving it to future work.
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(ii) If some strategy of an individual is both A-maximal and A-minimal for some A, then any strategy
of the individual is so.
(iii) If there exist strategies si ; s0i 2 Si , and an event sNi, and outcomes x, y 2 X with x 6¼ y,
p(sNi, si) = x, and pðsNi ; s0iÞ ¼ y, then i is effective for X  y in (sNi, si) and for X  x in
ðsNi ; s0iÞ.
(iv) No two different agents can be decisive for two different outcomes.
Proof. The first two clauses follow directly from the definitions.
(iii) As p(sNi, si) = x, and pðsNi ; s0iÞ ¼ y, it follows that x; y 2 pðsNiÞ implying
pðsNiÞ 6 X  x and pðsNiÞ 6 X  y. Since pðsNi ; s0iÞ ¼ y 2 X  x and since
pðsNiÞ 6 X  x, i is effective for X  x in ðsNi ; s0iÞ. Similarly,
pðsNi ; siÞ ¼ x 2 X  y and pðsNiÞ 6 X  y mean that i is effective for X  y in
(sNi, si).
(iv) Suppose to the contrary, there exist i, j (i 6¼ j) such that i is decisive for x, and j for y,
with x 6¼ y. Decisiveness of i for x implies pðsxi ; sNiÞ ¼ x for any sNi. Similarly,
decisiveness of j for y implies pðsyj ; sNjÞ ¼ y for any sNj. But then
pðsxi ; syj ; sNfi;jgÞ ¼ x ¼ y, contradicting x 6¼ y.
LEMMA 2. Let Gp be a responsibility game that is complete and uniform.
(i) For all sN, if some individual is responsible in sN for some A 2 [X], then he is fully responsible,
that is, he is responsible for all A 2 [X] containing p(sN).
(ii) N is decisive for each x 2 X.
(iii) For all i, (a) if there are x, y 2 X (x 6¼ y) and there is an s 2 Si that is both x-maximal and y-
maximal, or (b) if there is an x 2 X and an s 2 Si that is x-maximal as well as x-minimal, then i
is a dummy player.
Proof.
(i) Let i be responsible for some A in some sN. Take any other state of affairs B
containing the outcome p(sN). Since there are no voids, some individual is
responsible for B. By uniformity, i is then so as well.
(ii) Let sxN be a play in which all individuals adopt one of their x-maximising strategies
and let v denote the outcome of the play. By completeness, some i 2 N is responsible
for v. By (i), such i is fully responsible, i.e. responsible for any A 2 [X] containing v.
He is not responsible for X  x since an x-maximal strategy by assumption always is
X  x-minimal. The set X  x therefore cannot contain v, which entails x = v.
(iii) (a) Let s = sx = sy for some i, x, y 2 X (x 6¼ y) and s 2 Si . If a strategy is both maximal
andminimal for some outcome, then all strategies are so for that outcome. It therefore
suffices to show that s is both z-maximal and z-minimal for all z 2 X. Suppose this is not
so. For some z 2 X, s then is either (a1) not z-minimal or (a2) not Xz-minimal.
(a1) Let sN be a play in which i adopts s, which has z as its outcome, and in which i is
effective for z. Since s is not z-minimal, such a play must exist. Player i is then
responsible for z at sN: he is effective for z and he adopts a strategy that is
not z-minimal. We have z 2 X  x or z 2 X  y. Since x-maximality and
y-maximality of s by assumption entails X  x- and X  y-minimality, i is not
responsible for X  x and X  y, contradicting (i) above.
(a2) Now let sN be a play in which i adopts s, but which has an element of X  z as
its outcome, and in which i is effective for X  z. Because s is not X  z-
minimal, such a play exists. Player i is responsible for X  z at sN. By full
responsibility he should be so for all subsets of X containing p(sN). However,
since x-maximality and y-maximality of s by assumption entails X  x- and
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X  y-minimality, and since pðsN Þ 2 X  x or pðsN Þ 2 X  y, i is not respon-
sible for at least one set containing p(sN).
(b) Let s be a strategy that is x-maximal and x-minimal for some x 2 X. Take
y 2 X  x and let s 0 be a y-maximal strategy. Since s is x-maximal and
x-minimal, s 0 also is x-maximal. From (a) it now directly follows that i is a
dummy player.
LEMMA 3. Let Gp be a responsibility game that is complete and uniform. If pðsxS ; sNSÞ ¼ x for some
proper non-empty subset S of N and some sNS in which each i 2 N  S adopts a strategy syi that is maximal
for some yi 6¼ x, then S is decisive for {x}.
Proof. We first prove, by contradiction, that the result holds if N  S does not contain any
dummy players. Let pðsxS ; sNSÞ ¼ x where sNS is the event as described. Define
N  S = {1, . . ., t} and assume that for some play ðsxS ; s1; . . .; stÞ we have pðsxS ; s1; . . .; stÞ 6¼ x.
Consider the following sequence of plays:
s0N ¼ ðsxS ; s1; . . .. . .. . .::; stÞ and pðs0N Þ 6¼ x;
s1N ¼ ðsxS ; sy1 ; s2; . . .. . .; stÞ;
s2N ¼ ðsxS ; sy1 ; sy2 ; s3; . . .; stÞ;
..
.
stN ¼ðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .. . .. . .; syt Þ ¼ ðsxS ; sNSÞ and pðstN Þ ¼ x:
Let m be the largest m such that pðsm1N Þ ¼ v 6¼ x for some v 2 X. That is,
sm1N ¼ ðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; sm ; smþ1; . . .; stÞ and pðsm1N Þ ¼ v 6¼ x;
smN ¼ ðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; sym ; smþ1; . . .; stÞ and pðsmN Þ ¼ x:
Since pðstN Þ ¼ x 6¼ pðs0N Þ, such m exists. We show that for any s 2 Sm  fsymg:
pðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; s; smþ1; . . .; stÞ 2 fx; ymg; (A.1)
and thus that v ¼ ym . Suppose to the contrary that there is some z 6¼ x; ym and some s 2 Sm
such that:
pðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; s; smþ1; . . .; stÞ ¼ z:
By Lemma 1(iii), individual m is effective for X  z in smN . Since his strategy in smN is X  ym -
minimal, x 2 X  ym implies by uniformity and m’s effectivity for X  z that the strategy sym is
X  z-minimal, which means that sym ¼ sz . Lemma 2(iii) then implies that m is a dummy player.
This is a contradiction, which proves A.1.
Next assume for some z 6¼ x; ym we have:
pðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; szm ; smþ1; . . .; stÞ ¼ x:
Individual m is not responsible for outcome x because x 2 X  z and because szm is X  z-
minimal. By Lemma 2(i) he is then also not responsible for any other subset containing x. In
particular he is not for X  ym . Since he is effective for it, szm must be X  ym -minimal. This
means it is ym -maximal, contradicting Lemma 2(iii), case (a), and absence of dummy players in
N  S. Hence pðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; sz; smþ1; . . .; stÞ 6¼ x. By A.1, it follows that its outcome must be
ym , i.e. for all z 6¼ x; ym we have:
pðsxS ; sy1 ; . . .; sym1 ; szm ; smþ1; . . .; stÞ ¼ ym : (A.2)
To conclude the first part of the proof, we note that from X  z-minimality of szm , it follows
that m is not responsible for X  z. By Lemma 2(i) and ym 2 X  z, he is not responsible for any
other subset containing ym either. In particular he is not so for X  x. Since x ¼ pðsmN Þ, he is
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effective for X  x. Therefore szm must be X  xminimal. That means it is not only z-maximal but
also x-maximal, which contradicts Lemma 2(iii) and absence of dummy players.
Now consider cases in which N  S does contain dummy players. Let U be the set of all
dummy players in N  S. If U = N  S, the result follows from the proof of Lemma 2(ii) and the
fact that any strategy of a dummy player is maximal for any element. Assume U is a proper subset
of N  S. Since any strategy of i 2 U is x-maximal, applying the first part of the proof to S ∪ U
rather than to S shows that S ∪ U is decisive for x. From decisiveness of S ∪ U for x, and from the
fact that, by definition of a dummy player, any play of which sxS is a subevent also has s
x
S[U as a
subevent, it follows that S is decisive for x.
Proof of Theorem 1. We show that for any x 2 X there is an individual i who is decisive for x.
Since no two individuals can be decisive for different alternatives (Lemma 1(iv)), this suffices to
yield the theorem: i then is decisive for all x 2 X.
Take x 2 X. Let U be the set of all dummy players. If N = U, no one would be responsible for
the outcome of any play, violating completeness. Decisiveness of N for x, Lemma 3 and N 6¼ U,
together entail that N  U is also decisive for x. Hence, there is a coalition of non-dummy players
that is decisive for x. Let S be the smallest such set of non-dummy players, i.e. S does not have a
proper subset that is also decisive for x.
If S is a singleton set, then some individual is decisive for x, which we want to show. Suppose
therefore S is not a singleton set. We show that this leads to a contradiction. Take i 2 S and
consider the play ðsxSi ; syi ; szNSÞ, where x, y, and z are distinct elements of X. The outcome of the
play must be x, y or z: each individual would otherwise fail to be responsible for at least one
A 2 [X] containing the outcome (the members of S  i for X  x, i for X  y and the members
of N  S for X  z), which given Lemma 2(i) would entail that no one bears any responsibility
for features of the outcome, contradicting completeness. If the outcome is z, N  S is decisive for
z by Lemma 3, contradicting decisiveness of S for x. Hence the outcome is x or y. If the outcome
is x, then Lemma 3 implies that S  i is decisive for x, contradicting the way S was defined.
Hence, the outcome must be y and, by Lemma 3, i is decisive for y.
Now consider the play ðszNi ; sxi Þ. The outcome must be x or z. If it were some outcome v other
than z, X  z-minimality of the strategies of all j 6¼ i and absence of voids, would mean that i
would be the only person responsible for Xz, implying either a violation of uniformity or
decisiveness of i by Lemma 3. If the outcome is z, then N  i is decisive for z by Lemma 3,
contradicting decisiveness of i for y. The outcome thus is x and Lemma 3 shows that i is decisive
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